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Abstract. The RiskTrack project aims to help in the prevention of ter-
rorism through the identification of online radicalisation. In line with the
European Union priorities in this matter, this project has been designed
to identify and tackle the indicators that raise a red flag about which in-
dividuals or communities are being radicalised and recruited to commit
violent acts of terrorism. Therefore, the main goals of this project will be
twofold: On the one hand, it is needed to identify the main features and
characteristics that can be used to evaluate a risk situation, to do that
a risk assessment methodology studying how to detect signs of radicali-
sation (e.g., use of language, behavioural patterns in social networks...)
will be designed. On the other hand, these features will be tested and
analysed using advanced data mining methods, knowledge representation
(semantic and ontology engineering) and multilingual technologies. The
innovative aspect of this project is to not offer just a methodology on
risk assessment, but also a tool that is build based on this methodology,
so that the prosecutors, judges, law enforcement and other actors can
obtain a short term tangible results.
Keywords: Radicalisation, Risk assessment, Social Networks Analysis,
Terrorism prevention
1 Introduction
The West entered in a new era of perpetual danger for its people and its way
of living since 2001, when the 11-S jihadist attack happened in the USA. This
tragic event marked a before and an after in the West, because it unchained a
series of attacks by national and international extremist groups, in the name of
the Islamic State [18].
The European Union has as one of its top priorities to fight together ter-
rorism in all its forms to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens and to
?? Corresponding author: david.camacho@uam.es
maintain their safety. In order to do so, in 2005 an EU Counter-terrorism strat-
egy was stablished by the European Council; the strategy is sustained by four
pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. This strategy was revised in 2014
by the European Council and it came out with guidelines of measures for EU
member states to follow and put into effect [17,29].
The new jihadist terrorism has characteristics in common with other types
of terrorism; despite this, it has an idiosyncratic nature, particularly the way to
radicalise its militants. When it comes to understanding this peculiarity and the
series of stages that it takes for a person to become radicalised, it is mandatory
to look into the unique traits of jihadist terrorism. This could give essential infor-
mation to detect and prevent radicalisation. Great efforts are needed to prevent
radicalisation and develop efficient counter-terrorism measures: the size of the
violence perpetrated, the psychological consequences for Western citizens and
the constant innovation of these terrorists to carry out their attacks make this
matter a top urgency for governments and counter-terrorism institutions [18].
Jihadist radicalisation has its own process, and also their militants have many
vulnerability factors that made them adequate targets. The United Nations Of-
fice of Drugs and Crime [40] sustains that such factors are related to demographic
and socio-economic situations. Nevertheless, this kind of explanation is very lim-
ited [15,16]. It has to be taken into account that Muslim religion has more than
1300 believers across the planet who suffer, as well as jihadists, the same serious
political, social and economic problems; and yet, jihadism is not as widespread
as can be expected, and a very small percentage of these faithful Muslims agree
with this extremist perspective, although jihadists denounce clear and loud the
difficulties Muslim countries and Muslim people undergo.
In this way, radicalisation is triggered by not only socio-demographic factors,
but also by personal life experiences and situations and basic needs, emotions and
feelings. In fact, these people usually start its radicalisation by entering them-
selves in this dynamic, auto-exploring radical ideologies and getting in touch
with extremist individuals or circles, longing to fulfil these needs. The entrance
and the stay in radical networks, and also the appearance of determined be-
haviours, can be encouraged by the social recognition and feel of belonging they
can provide. Humiliation, indignation, anger, guilt, hatred and frustration are
the most related emotions and feelings to jihadist radicalisation [4,36].
The RiskTrack project will have its base on these radicalisation factors, fo-
cusing studying, understanding and identifying them on the Internet. Although
there are complex software tools that make it hard to track private communi-
cations among radicals, such as anonymising software and encryption tools [40],
there is a huge amount of information published by these radicalised individuals
in public social media which can be traced.
Thus, the most used social networks, such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube,
Tumblr and Instagram, have become a new and dynamic scenario for the jihadist
cause: they serve as propaganda sharing platforms, psychological warfare, live
forums and recruitment assets. As in 2012 the message that “any Muslim who
tries the jihad against the enemy by electronic means is considered one way or an-
other a Mujahid” was spread through the Al-Fida and Shumukh al-Islam forum,
generations of youths have listened and the use of social media, with which they
are familiar, as a new place for the Jihad [22]. Thus, according to the UNODC
document “The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes” [40], terrorists make
use of the Internet and social media to spread their propaganda, accompanied by
instructions, justifications and explanations, promoting their acts with virtual
messages, such as presentations, video files, among others; and also, as men-
tioned above, to make connections with potential radicals. But not only are the
already named social networks used for these purposes: jihadists use massively
the Internet through forums, web pages, blogs, chats, multimedia publications,
messages and emails, virtual communities, among others [13]. Consequently, the
Network allows vulnerable individuals to get sensitive information or get in touch
with other people with their same restlessness or already radicalised people, who
could give positive feedback among each other about their extremist ideas and
encourage the radicalisation process. Also, the powerful feeling of belonging is
present, as the Network favours the international communications which give the
sensation of being part of a transnational movement [38,39]. And finally, radi-
calised individuals or terrorists have a wide way of communication with others
to collaborate together or to radicalise: by getting the attention of other groups,
cells or radicalised individuals through their Network activity while in the pro-
cess of radicalisation, or leaders or ‘recruiters’ to contact potential new members.
The importance of online connections is supported by the fact that self-
radicalisation or no social interaction at all is unlikely or practically impossible;
even individuals who seem that they were alone in the process, they had from
the beginning strong influences of other people, who had already contact with
radical environment or were members of a terrorist group, by getting in touch
with them on the Internet [37]. Furthermore, usually the process involves that,
while gradually drifting apart from friends or reference peer groups, the subjects
get closer to other individuals to radicalise or be radicalised [15]. Nevertheless,
these communications with people who are already radicalised or active mem-
bers of terrorist groups can sometimes be unexpected and a result of chance [33].
This project will focus on the extraction of radicalisation factors on social
media and their detection through a cyber-tool of own creation. There are many
tools to extract information of online sources, but there is a lack of a specific and
specialised tool for online radicalisation, and this is a problem for Law Enforce-
ment Agencies, Probation Services, Intelligence Services and also for researchers
and industry. Examples of suitable technologies for knowledge extraction are,
for example, Big Data [9,25], Artificial Intelligence [24] and Data Mining [10],
which set the bases for the development of a new specialised tool, nourished with
adequate psychologist methodologies in order to process and make an extraction
of pertinent information with which model the behaviour of human users [6,8].
Because of the previously exposed, it is imperative a project of this kind, to
analyse radicalisation on the Internet and being able to develop and use solid
tools which would detect radicalisation and prevent it.
2 Risk assessment for radicalisation in social media
The survey conducted by Agarwal and Sureka [1] showed that over the past
10 years there has been many studies about detecting radicalisation by min-
ing textual data from public social media sources. Microblogs such as Twitter
and Tumblr were the most common websites used for this purpose, but stud-
ies with YouTube, the most often used platform for jihadist propaganda, were
not found. About the tools used for detecting and predicting online radicalisa-
tion in social media, the researches claim that the most popular techniques are
Clustering (Blog Spider), Topical Crawler/Link Analysis (Breadth First Search,
Depth First Search, Best First Search), KNN (K Nearest Neighbor), Keyword
Based Flagging (KBF), Decision Tree, Support Vector Machine, Exploratory
Data Analysis (EDA), Rule Based Classier and Naive Bayes. Some examples
of the latest studies regarding the development of a tool for radicalisation risk
assessment are the following.
Monahan questioned in the study ’The Individual Risk Assessment of Terror-
ism’ [26] the challenges that should be faced in order to carry out a trustworthy
risk assessment for violent extremists. The research revised identified indicators
for potential criminal behaviour and compared them to the findings of literature
dedicated to terrorism, concluding that they were not proper for risk assess-
ment of terrorism. Thus, the work explained, as a result of literature review,
that potential adequate candidates for specialised indicators are grievances, ide-
ologies, affiliations and moral emotions. Also, different approaches to make an
assessment were compared – unmodified clinical risk assessment, modified clin-
ical risk assessment, structured professional judgement, modified actuarial risk
assessment and unmodified actuarial risk assessment – to finally state that the
most useful approach for terrorism risk assessment may be structured profes-
sional judgement. About the issue of the validation of a risk assessment tool of
terrorism, the author maintains that this tool should be validated through ex
post facto studies, with already registered terrorists and non-terrorist subjects
from the same population, as it would be unlikely to do it prospectively.
The work of Pressman and Flockton [30] explored the possibility of making
a VERA 2 (parting from the original VERA - Violent Extremist Risk Assess-
ment protocol) for terrorists, violent extremists and unlawful violent offenders
impelled by political, social or religious ideologies. They highlighted the need
of using specific indicators for assessing terrorists’ behaviour, as they strongly
differ from violent criminals in general. As they state, an approach to build this
specialised tool is viable by a structured professional judgment once appropriate
risk indicators are identified, as the VERA 2 does.
In this line, the book Combating Violent Extremism and Radicalization in the
Digital Era [21] includes a chapter which proposes the application of the VERA
2 in social media [31]. The authors focus on cyber-language, imagery elements,
online social context and behaviour to create the CYBER-VERA or CYBERA
risk assessment tool, to use it in addition to VERA 2 or other instruments
or techniques already in use by security and intelligence agencies, as well as
professionals such as psychologists or communication analysts. The protocol was
tested successfully with a case of cyber-radicalisation.
3 Methods and frameworks for Social Data Analysis
As it has been previously said, the majority of the jihadist radicalisation takes
part in the social media. This is because the number of connected users through
Social Networks (SN) is increasing every day [28]. For this reason, it is extremely
important the development of methods and frameworks to analyze the Social
Data.
The area of Social Networks, and the possibility to analyse huge amounts
of data, has attracted the attention to research areas as Machine Learning, Big
Data, Statistics or Physics among others. Traditionally, the problem of commu-
nity finding has been studied from Graph-based computing, Machine learning
as Clustering or Computational Intelligence. The area of Social Network Anal-
ysis [34] provides methods, algorithms, frameworks and systems that allows to
analyse the information stored in this SNs to obtain useful information for users.
This section will be focused on the two key concepts related to the Social Net-
work Analysis: Community Finding and EgoNetworks.
3.1 Community Finding
Community finding is one of the most important task when studying networks.
The network is composed by a set of nodes that represents the objects of the
network, and the interactions among these objects appear as the edges of the
network.
The goal of any community finding method is to group the different nodes
in several clusters in such a way the nodes belonging to the same cluster share
some properties. There is a plethora of applications that gravitates around the
community finding problem. For example, it is used to discover functionally re-
lated objects [41], to study the different interactions between the objects [3], or
to predict unobserved connections [12] among others.
In these networks, there are two different sources of data that can be used
to perform community finding tasks. The first one is related to the information
stored in the different nodes that compose the network; whereas the second one
is extracted from the set of network connections.
The decision of what kind of data will be used in the community finding
problem is an important task that will affect to the performance of the proposed
algorithm. On the one hand, using the information contained in the network
will be useful to cluster those nodes with similar characteristics, but those nodes
without this specific information will not be correctly clustered. On the other
hand, the results obtained using the information extracted from the network will
represent the different relationships among the nodes but it will fail with nodes
with few connections.
3.2 Ego Networks
The number of users registered in the different Social Networks, and the volume
of information generated by them are increasing every day. This fact makes ex-
tremely difficult any analysis over the whole network without the application of
an approach based on the well-known Big Data paradigm [7]. In order to extract
the knowledge from the network, some relevant works have focused the attention
to Ego Networks [19].
An Ego Network is a social network composed by one user centering the
graph (called ’Ego’), being all the users connected to this Ego (called ’Alters’)
and all the relations among the alters. Given a specific Social Network com-
posed by N different users, there are N different Ego Networks associated with
the given network (one Ego Network for each user). Figure 1(a) provides an ex-
ample of a Social Network composed by 8 users, whereas Figure 1(b) shows the
Ego Network for the selected user (coloured node) from Figure 1(a).
One of the most extended algorithms in this area is the Clique Percola-
tion Method (CPM) [20]. It is based on the concept that different communities
exhibit high density, i.e. the nodes of the community are highly connected. Ini-
tially this algorithm looks for all the cliques of size k. Then, a reduced graph is
created by considering a node each of the k-cliques previously identified. Two
nodes belong to the same community if their corresponding k-cliques share k−1
members. Other approaches use the topology of the network to detect the dif-
ferent communities by dividing the network based on the different links or edges
[5]. Other popular algorithm is the one proposed by Clauset et al. [14]. The
Clauset-Newman-Moore [35] algorithm is based on the Edge Betweenness
algorithm [27]: given a dataset composed by N elements, this algorithm starts
considering N isolated nodes that represent the elements of the dataset. Then,
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Fig. 1. a) Representation as a graph of a Social Network composed by 8 users. b) Ego
Network whose ego is the coloured node from the left SN.
the algorithm starts iteratively adding links of the original graph to produce the
largest possible increase of the modularity at each step. Label Propagation is
an algorithm proposed in [32] that it is used to perform the community finding
task. The algorithm is based on the propagation of different labels through the
edges of the network in order to define the clusters. In this algorithm, a cluster
is defined as the set of nodes that shares the same label among them. Initially,
each node is given a specific label from the set of k labels. When all the nodes
are labelled, the algorithm, iteratively, changes the labels of the nodes. For a
specific node, the new label will be the one that is most common among its
neighbours. Finally, the different clusters are composed by those groups densely
connected with a unique label. Other hierarchical agglomerative algorithm is the
Walktrap algorithm [11]. In the first step of this algorithm, N different clus-
ters are created for the N elements that will be analyzed. Then, two clusters
are merged taking into account the number of random walks that connect the
elements of both clusters. The key concept of this algorithm is based on the
premise that elements belonging to the same cluster share many connection, or
edges, whereas there are few connections between the elements from different
clusters. In the literature can also be found the Infomap algorithm [2]. Initially,
each element is assigned to only one cluster composed by the node itself. Then,
iteratively, nodes are moved to a neighbouring cluster that results in the largest
decrease of the map equation. This map equation measures the trade-of between
the compression of data and the extraction of patterns within those data. The
algorithm is executed until there are not any movement that decreases the value
of the map equation.
Finally, there are other works that uses different probabilistic approaches in
order to estimate the community membership of the different elements [23].
4 Next steps and future work
The achievements of the RiskTrack project will be developed in two parallel
phases. The first one will be handle by a team of behaviour scientists composed
by terrorism and risk assessment experts: they will provide the basic features to
identify the radicalisation and how to make an accurate assessment. On the other
hand, two engineering teams will be the responsible to generate both, an ontol-
ogy and data representation to adequately process the information extracted
from a set of selected Web sites (as Twitter), and a set of data-analitics tools,
able to apply previous radical features provided from the terrorism experts over
the data gathered from the Web.
The initial steps to carry out in this project will be the following: the identi-
fication of radicalisation indicators, designing the methodology to evaluate these
indicators and generating a set of data benchmarks that will be used later to
design a radicalisation ontology, and the set of data mining algorithms to process
them.
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